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SERVICE-CONNECTION AND DRUG-RELATED 
OFFENSES: THE MILITARY COURTS' EVER-
EXPANDING JURISDICTION* 
The military community in the United States now consists of 
over two million volunteers.1 If any of these servicemembers are 
accused of a crime, their only judicial recourse may be to courts-
martial: a system of military courts created under Congress's 
Article I powers, independent of - and with limited review by -
Article III courts.2 This judicial system denies its defendants basic 
constitutional rights3 - rights otherwise guaranteed by the Con-
stitution these men and women have sworn to defend, if neces-
sary, with their lives.4 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged both the constitutional 
basis and the need for a separate military judicial system.5 N one-
theless, to minimize the military's encroachment on individual lib-
erties, the Court restricts military courts' jurisdiction to "'the 
least possible power adequate to the end proposed'''6 by allowing 
military courts jurisdiction only over military personneF who al-
legedly commit "service-connected" crimes.8 By devising the 
service-connection requirement in O'Callahan 'D. Parker,9 the 
Court provided eligible servicemembers the right to a trial in a 
civilian court, free from the shortcomings of the military courts. 
To clarify the O'Callahan decision, the Court, in Relford 'D. Com-
mandant,10 refined the service-connection test by specifying crite-
ria probative of service connection, requiring courts, by reference 
to the enumerated criteria, to determine on a case-by-case basis 
whether a given offense is service connected.11 
In the years since O'Callahan and Relford, military courts have 
* This Note was developed by Michael Caudell-Feagan and Daniel Warshawsky. 
1. U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE/84 ALMANAC, Sept. 1984, at 24. 
2. See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
4. See 10 U.S.C. § 502 (1982) (enlistment oath). 
5. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1952). 
6. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955)). 
7. Id. at 267 (indicating that precedent dictates courts-martial have no jurisdic-
tion over persons who are not members of the military). 
8. Id. at 272. 
9. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
10. 401 U.S. 355 (1971). The Court recognized that the O'Callahan decision had 
engendered confusion in the military courts. See id. at 370. 
11. See id. at 365-69. For the Court's list of probative criteria see infra note 84. 
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at times only reluctantly adhered to the Supreme Court's strict 
service-connection analysis, particularly for defendants charged 
with drug-related offenses.12 Nevertheless, until recently, mili-
tary courts set aside their reluctance and diligently applied the 
service-connection criteria whenever defendants challenged the 
courts' jurisdiction.13 Yet, military courts are now discarding the 
ad hoc approach and are returning to a virtual per se test that 
finds all drug offenses service connected.14 Instead of judging 
each case against the Relford Court's criteria, military courts jus-
tify their assertions of jurisdiction merely by incanting broad gen-
eralizations about the gravity of narcotics abuse in the military.15 
This total disregard of the Supreme Court's mandate undermines 
the Court's attempt at providing some military defendants with 
the individual liberties otherwise available only through the civil-
ian legal system. 
This Note explores the service-connection requirement and mil-
itary courts' application of the requirement to service personnel 
charged with drug-related offenses. Part I outlines the organiza-
tion and constitutional basis of the court-martial system. By con-
trasting the civilian and military judicial systems, this Note 
demonstrates the serious disadvantages suffered by defendants in 
military courts. Part II traces the Supreme Court's development 
of the service-connection test for military courts' jurisdiction. 
Part III summarizes the military courts' application of the service-
connection test to drug-related offenses, and emphasizes the Court 
of Military Appeals' recent reinterpretation and expansion of the 
jurisdiction of courts-martial. Part IV analyzes and critiques the 
military courts' redefinition of the service-connection test, and 
suggests that the military courts' current approach violates the 
Supreme Court's precedential explication of this jurisdictional 
requirement. 
12. Note, Federal Civilian Court Intervention in Pending Courts-Martial and the 
Proper Scope of Military Jurisdiction Over Criminal Defendants: Schlesinger v. 
Councilman and McLucas v. Dechamplain, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 432, 469-71 
(1976); see, e.g., Rainville v. Lee, 22 C.M.A. 464, 464-65, 47 C.M.R. 554, 554-55 (1973). 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 342 (C.M.A. 1980); United States 
v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414, 416 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Moore, 1 M.J. 448, 450 (C.M.A. 
1976). 
14. In United States v. Trottier, the Court of Military Appeals questioned its 
"slavish" application of the Relford criteria. See United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 
343-45 (C.M.A.1980). This decision was characterized as a return to a per se rule, see 
in!ra note 171 and accompanying text, and military courts have adhered to such an 
approach, see in!ra notes 172, 177, 189 and accompanying text. 
15. See, e.g., Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 78-79 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. 
Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 345 (C.M.A.1980). 
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L Military Courts: The Society Apart 
Article I of the Constitution empowers Congress to "make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces."16 Pursuant to this provision, Congress enacted the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice17 and created a system of courts-
martial independent of the federal courts established under Arti-
cle IlL IS This separate military system has developed its own pro-
cedures and defined its own crimes and sanctions.19 
In light of Article 1's explicit grant of congressional power, and 
in deference to the particular needs of the military, the Supreme 
Court has taken a very limited role in developing and supervising 
military courts.20 Until relatively recently, all federal courts 
lacked power to review directly the substantive determinations of 
military courts; instead, the courts were limited to a collateral re-
view of the military courts' personal and subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.21 Further, although Congress's 1983 amendments to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice gave parties in military tribu-
nals the right to submit writs of certiorari to the Supreme COurt,22 
the avenues for direct review remain limited.23 The military and 
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
17. Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108 (1950) (codified as 
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982 & Supp. II (1984)). The statutory outline is 
augmented by the U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANuAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED 
STATES 1984 (rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as MANuAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL], as 
authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, see 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1982). 
18. D. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 
(1982). 
19. Id. 
20. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1952). The Court stated: 
Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and 
apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment. 
This Court has played no role in its development; we have exerted no su-
pervisory power over the courts which enforce it; the rights of men in the 
armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding de-
mands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies 
which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. 
The Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
21. See Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950) (stating that a court-martial has 
sole jurisdiction over the accused, and that any errors it may have committed are 
solely the concern of the military authorities); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890) 
(because civil courts exercise no supervisory powers over courts-martial, court-
martial errors are not open to consideration by civilian courts); Ex parte Val-
landigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 253 (1863) (stating that a court of military commis-
sion exercises a special authority). 
22. Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, § 10(c)(2), 97 Stat. 1393, 1405-
06 (1983) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 867(h) (Supp. II 1984)). 
23. In deference to concerns about the Supreme Court's docket, Congress limited 
the number of decisions subject to direct review. H.R. REp. No. 549, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess.16, 17 (1983). Only decisions by the highest military court, the Court of Military 
Appeals, are subject to review. See 10 U.S.C. § 867(h)(1) (Supp. II 1984). If the Court 
of Military Appeals does not grant a petition for review, the Supreme Court has com-
plete discretion to refuse to grant petitions for writs of certiorari. H.R. REP. No. 549, 
supra, at 17. 
Lower federal courts remain limited to a collateral review of the military court's 
personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 
746,758 (1975). 
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its court system thus remain a "society apart from civilian 
society."24 
Members of the military who are unfortunate enough to appear 
as defendants before military courts face a tribunal far different 
from its civilian counterpart. Over the past four decades, Con-
gress has extensively reformed the military court system,25 and 
the military has, itself, extended a panoply of constitutional pro-
tections to its defendants.26 Yet, despite these reforms, defendants 
tried in military courts suffer serious disadvantages that do not 
afflict defendants in civilian courts - disadvantages rooted in both 
the Constitution and the nature of the military COurts.27 
Defendants in military courts are not necessarily entitled to all 
the procedural protections available to defendants in civilian 
courts. Although the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to a 
grand jury indictment, the Amendment specifically excludes 
"cases arising in the land or naval forces."28 Further, the Supreme 
24. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1973). Many commentators have questioned 
the theoretical justification for the separate society. See, e.g., Sherman, Military Jus-
tice Without Military Contro~ 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1416-17 (1973); Warren, The Bill of 
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187-203 (1962); Zillman & 
Imwinkelried, Constitutional Rights and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Soci-
ety Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 396, 434-36 (1975). But see Schlesinger v. Council-
man, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975) (stating that the military must insist upon a respect for 
duty and discipline without counterpart in civilian life); Bishop, Perspective: The Case 
for Military Justice, 62 MIL. L. REV. 215, 221-24 (1973) (favoring expansion of the role 
of an independent military judiciary). 
25. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108 (1950) (codified as 
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)) (consolidating, revising, and 
codifying the Articles of War, Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the disci-
plinary laws of the Coast Guard); Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 
Stat. 1335 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (establishing courts 
of military review); Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (authorizing certain protections to the accused 
in courts-martial). 
26. See United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 640, 37 C.M.R. 249, 260 (1967) 
(Miranda warnings); United States v. Schalck, 14 C.M.A. 371, 374, 34 C.M.R. 151, 154 
(1964) (right to a speedy trial); United States v. Vierra, 14 C.M.A. 48, 53-54, 33 C.M.R. 
260, 265-66 (1963) (freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures); United States 
v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960) (right to confront wit-
nesses). See generally AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: FED-
ERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND MILrrARY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
(1982) (analyzing the compatibility of the Federal Rules with court-martial procedure 
and military law). 
27. See U.S. G.A.O., FuNDAMENTAL CHANGES NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE INDEPEN-
DENCE AND EFFICIENCY OF THE MILrrARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 40 (1978) (suggesting that 
organizational changes are needed for substantive improvements in the independence 
of the military's judicial system); West, A History of Command Influence on the Mili-
tary Judicial System, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 150-51 (1970) (asserting that commanding 
officers still exert substantial undue influence over courts-martial); Comment, The 
Military Justice Act of 1968: Congress Takes Half-Steps Against Unlawful Command 
Influence, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 429, 440-41 (1969) (arguing that the Military Justice Act 
of 1968 is ineffective against command influence). 
28. U.S. CaNST. amend. V. 
Court has held that the Constitution does not guarantee the right 
to trial by jury in military COurtS.29 Though each of these depriva-
tions is significant, a military defendant's inability to secure a trial 
by jury is the more serious.30 
Article III of the Constitution provides: "The trial of all Crimes, 
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . ."31 The 
Sixth Amendment reaffirms the right to trial by jury: "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed .... "32 The 
Supreme Court has characterized trial by jury as the citizen's bul-
wark against governmental oppression,33 and has emphasized the 
jury's importance by expanding the criminal defendant's right to a 
trial by an impartial jury of his peers. The Court has protected 
the right to trial by jury by applying the requirement to state 
courts as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment 
when the accused is charged with a serious crime,34 by holding 
juries with fewer than six members unconstitutional,35 by requir-
ing unanimous verdicts from six-person juries,36 and by ensuring 
the impartiality and representativeness of the jury.37 Indeed, trial 
29. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 
40 (1942). See generally Van Loan, The Jury, the Court-Martial, and the Constitution, 
57 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 410-11 (1972) (arguing that the framers did not intend to 
require trial by jury in military tribunals and that the omission of a specific exception 
from the Sixth Amendment was an oversight). 
30. The Uniform Code of Military Justice has partially remedied the unavailabil-
ity of the right to a grand jury indictment by requiring a "thorough and impartial 
investigation of all matters set forth in a charge or specification." 10 U.S.C. § 832(a) 
(1982). In a precourt-martial investigation, the accused now has the right to counsel, 
the right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. 10 U.S.C. 
§ 832(b) (1982). However, unlike constitutional protections, these rights can be cur-
tailed through the normal legislative process. Moreover, upon completion of the in-
vestigation, the convening authority, not a grand jury, determines whether the 
evidence warrants a trial. See 10 U.S.C. § 834 (Supp. II 1984). On the other hand, the 
right to indictment by a grand jury, unlike the right to a jury trial, has not been incor-
porated in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884), and therefore is not necessarily available in all state courts 
where servicemembers accused of non-service-connected crimes may be tried. 
D. EMERSON, GRAND JURY REFORM: A REVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 11-12 (1983). Thus, 
defendants in courts-martial are not necessarily deprived of a civilian right to a grand 
jury. 
31. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2. 
32. U.S. CaNST. amend. VI. 
33. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). 
34. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968). 
35. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978). The Court analyzed psycholog-
ical studies and found that the reliability of juries containing fewer than six people is 
seriously impaired. See id.; accord Comment, Military Triers of Fact: A Needless 
Deprivation of Constitutional Protections?, 33 HAsTINGS L.J. 727, 744-45 (1982) (dis-
cussing the inadequate fact-finding capabilities of small juries). 
36. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979). 
37. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975) (right to petit jury selected 
from a representative section of the community is violated by systematic exclusion of 
women from jury panels); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 (1968) (over-
turning conviction because statute excluded potential jurors if they stated they had 
"conscientious scruples" against capital punishment). 
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by jury is considered a jewel of Anglo-American jurisprudence.3s 
Nevertheless, military courts try defendants without this funda-
mental protection. 
Military and Article III courts also differ in the essential nature 
of their respective judiciaries. Defendants tried in federal civilian 
courts are protected by Article III's requirement of an independ-
ent judiciary.39 Article III judges are essentially uninfluenced by 
the prosecutor or other branches of the government;40 the judges' 
sole purpose is to administer justice.41. Moreover, judges' indepen-
dence and objectivity are protected by tenure and undiminishable 
salary, as well as by longstanding judicial tradition.42 
The court-martial system stands in stark contrast to the civilian 
courts. Courts-martial serve a dual role: they both administer jus-
tice and enforce the military's need for discipline and efficiency.43 
Generally, a court-martial is an ad hoc tribunal convened by a 
commanding officer to hear a specific case.44 As the convening au-
thority, the commanding officer can exert substantial influence 
over the court-martial's proceeding.45 He decides not only 
whether to pursue a case, but also what type of court-martial to 
convene.46 The officer's selection of a general, special, or sum-
mary court-martial determines the punishments that may be im-
posed and the protections that are available to the defendant.47 
No matter what forum is selected, the accused has the right to 
select a trial by a panel of servicemembers, rather than solely by a 
38. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379 (stating that trial by jury is "the most 
transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy"). 
39. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; United States ex Tel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 
16 (1955). 
40. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1933). 
41. See United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 43-44 (1959) (Article III 
courts constitutionally prohibited from exercising powers of an executive or legisla-
tive nature); see also C. ANTIEAu, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 11.13-11.15 (1979) 
(constitutional provisions protecting the separation of powers prohibit both the im-
pairment of Article III courts' independence and the exercise of legislative or execu-
tive power by Article III courts). 
42. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; United States ex Tel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 
16 (1955); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 264 (1969). The independence of state-
court judges is not always as well guaranteed. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Inde-
pendence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 683 n.14 (1979). 
43. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1969). 
44. D. SCHLUETER, supra note 18, at 13. 
45. See U.S. G.A.O., supra note 27, at 6-7. 
46. 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-24 (1982). 
47. The general court-martial is the highest trial level. It may comprise a military 
judge sitting alone, if requested by the defendant, or a military judge and a panel of 
not less than five members. 10 U.S.C. § 816(1) (Supp. II 1984). The general court-
martial may prescribe any punishment allowed in the Maximum Punishment Chart, 
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 17, at A12-1 to A12-8, including the death penalty, 
confinement at hard labor for up to 20 years, or a dishonorable discharge. If the de-
fendant opts for a panel, a verdict need be unanimous only if death is the mandatory 
punishment. 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(1) (1982). For a sentence in excess of 10 years, three-
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military judge or commissioned officer.48 If the defendant re-
quests a panel, the convening authority selects the panel mem-
bers.49 Thus, the individual who, after an initial review of the 
case, signed the charges and decided that the case warranted a 
trial also selects the panel that will try the accused.50 Moreover, 
panel members, aware that the convening authority can affect 
their progress in the military and respectful of their superiors, are 
often subject to the subtle or direct influence of the commanding 
officer who has already indicated that a defendant should stand 
trial.51 Further, the panels tend to be unrepresentative of the mil-
fourths of the members must concur, id. § 852(b)(2), and, for other guilty verdicts, 
only two-thirds need concur, id. § 852(b)(3). 
The special court-martial is the intermediate court in the military judicial structure 
and may be comprised of a single military judge, a minimum of three members with-
out a military judge, or a military judge and three panel members. Id. § 816(2). The 
special court-martial may try any noncapital offense, but the maximum sentences it 
may impose are six months confinement, three months hard labor without confine-
ment, six months forfeiture of two-thirds pay, demotion, or a bad conduct discharge. 
Id. § 819. 
The summary court-martial may be convened only with the accused's consent. Id. 
§ 820. One commissioned officer, who need not be a lawyer, presides. Id. § 816. The 
maximum punishment is one month's confinement, hard labor without confinement 
for 45 days, restriction to specified limits for two months, or forfeiture of two-thirds of 
one month's pay. Id. § 820. Because the summary court-martial cannot imprison the 
defendant, the defendant has no right to appointed counsel. See Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
Commanders are also empowered to impose nonjudicial punishments, including 
correctional custody for up to 30 days, reduction in pay, restrictions, extra duties and 
forfeiture of up to seven day's pay. 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). A ser-
vicemember may, however, refuse nonjudicial punishment and demand a court-
martial, except when on a vessel at sea. Id. § 815(a) (1982). 
48. Although summary courts-martial and nonjudicial punishment do not provide 
for trial by a panel of servicemembers, 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(3), 815(b) (1982 & Supp. II 
1984), the accused must acquiesce before the initiation of a summary court-martial, id. 
§ 820 (1982), and in most cases must consent to the infliction of nonjudicial punish-
ments, id. § 815(a). If a servicemember objects to these proceedings, he will be tried 
by either special or general court-martial; in both cases he has the right to trial by a 
panel of servicemembers. Id. § 816(1)-(2) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
49. 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1982). 
50. Id. §§ 825(d)(2), 830(a). After a pretrial investigation, see id. § 832(a), and 
upon the advice of the staff judge advocate, see id. § 834(a) (Supp. II 1984), the conven-
ing authority independently decides whether to refer charges to trial. See id. § 830(b) 
(1982). Generally, the convening authority's decision to refer the case to a court-
martial is sacrosanct. See D. SCHLUETER, supra note 18, at 202. 
51. Congress enacted the Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 
1335 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.), to redress the over-
whelming potential for command influence. See S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
3 (1968). The modifications failed to eradicate the problem: the Act's vague language 
grants the convening authority wide discretion in selecting panel members and re-
quires only that he select individuals who, "in his opinion, are best qualified for the 
duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial 
temperament." 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1982). 
Legal scholars have attacked the 1968 Act. Luther C. West states: "The real cause 
of the disease itself ... remains uninhibited by [the 1968 Act's] changes. The military 
judicial setting is still dominated by military commanders, from the inception of 
charges to the completion of appellate review .... " West, A History of Command 
Influence on the Military Judicial System, 18 UCLA L. REv. 1, 151 (1970). See also 
Remcho, Military Juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Needfor Reform, 47 IND. 
L.J. 193, 195 (1972) (general critique of military juries); Comment, Stacked Juries: A 
Problem of Military Injustice, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 362, 374 (1970) (observing that 
when an enlisted man elects trial by a panel as provided by the 1968 Act, he is usually 
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itary community: they are normally comprised of commissioned 
officers or senior noncommissioned officers.52 Thus, enlisted per-
sonnel are judged not by their peers, but by members of the com-
mand structure.53 
Not surprisingly, court-martial panels are widely perceived as 
biased in favor of the military authorities.54 Indeed, the Court of 
Military Appeals itself has recognized that court-martial panels, 
handpicked by a commanding officer and requiring less than a 
unanimous vote by their five or fewer members for a valid convic-
tion, are a far cry from the impartial jury trials that the Supreme 
Court has mandated in civilian criminal trialS.55 
Finally, unlike Article III judges, military judges are not pro-
tected by tenure or an undiminishable salary.56 Although the Mil-
itary Justice Act of 1968 created a field judiciary of full-time 
judges assigned directly to the Judge Advocate General,57 the mili-
tary judge's independence remains circumscribed by the judge's 
position as an officer in the very branch of the government that 
prosecutes the defendants appearing before the judge.58 
In sum, military courts afford defendants significantly fewer 
protections than do their civilian counterparts. Not only is the 
military defendant denied certain fundamental civil rights, such as 
trial by an impartial jury, he is also judged by decisionmakers 
whose impartiality is not guaranteed. 
faced with officers and noncommissioned officers, thereby increasing rather than 
reducing command influence). 
52. Remcho, supra note 51, at 195; Comment, supra note 51, at 374. 
53. In contrast, courts struggle to assure that civilian juries remain impartial and 
representative. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
54. Court-martial panels are criticized both by legal scholars, see infra note 51, 
and by servicemembers. One survey asked military defendants whether the military 
panels in their cases were "fair and unbiased:" 17.1% answered yes, 63.4% said no, and 
19.5% did not know. The survey's author concluded: "[I]t is unlikely that the strongly 
negative attitudes of military defendants would be duplicated among the civilian pris-
oner population." Pitkin, The Military Justice System: An Analysis from the Defen-
dant's Perspective, 29 JAG 251,267-268 (1977); see also Remcho, supra note 51, at 196 
(suggesting that few enlisted personnel elect the jury option because of fear of bias in 
favor of military authorities on the part of senior noncommissioned officers). 
55. See United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, 29 n.3 (C.M.A. 1976). Five-member 
panels do not meet the base size and voting requirements that the Supreme Court has 
found necessary to avoid seriously impairing the functioning of juries. See supra 
notes 35-36 and accompanying text. The General Accounting Office has recom-
mended that Congress require random selection of military jurors and consider en-
larging the size of juries. U.S. G.A.O., MILITARY JURY SYSTEM NEEDS SAFEGUARDS 
FOUND IN CIVILIAN FEDERAL COURTS 44 (1977). 
56. See United States ex reI. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). 
57. See 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
58. See Pitkin, supra note 54, at 257-58. Congress has recognized the problem of 
judicial independence, and has required the establishment of a commission to evalu-
ate changes needed "to ensure maintenance of an independent military judiciary, 
including a term of tenure." Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 
§ 9(b)(3)(D), 97 Stat. 1393, 1405 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 867 note (Supp. II 1984)). 
IL The Supreme Court: Restrictions On Military 
Courts' Jurisdiction 
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged both the consti-
tutional basis and the necessity for restricting the rights of mili-
tary defendants, the Court has also attempted to ameliorate these 
deprivations by progressively restricting the jurisdiction of the 
military COurtS.59 To balance the necessity for Article I military 
tribunals with the need to protect the constitutional rights of indi-
vidual military defendants,60 the Court has limited Congress's 
power to authorize trial by court-martial to "'the least possible 
power adequate to the end proposed.' "61 
In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,62 the first in a series of 
decisions limiting military courts' jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
held that military courts lack jurisdiction over ex-servicemembers 
- even if the ex-servicemembers are charged with crimes alleg-
edly committed while on active duty.63 The Quarles Court strictly 
construed Congress's power to vest military courts with jurisdic-
tional authority, based partly on the Court's conclusion that mili-
tary courts lack the qualifications that the Constitution deems 
essential to fair civil trials.54 In Reid v. Covert,65 the Court further 
narrowed the jurisdiction of courts-martial, holding that military 
courts lack jurisdiction to try and imprison civilians, even if the 
civilians are dependents of servicemembers and live on a military 
base overseas.66 The Court again emphasized the limitations in-
herent in military justice,67 stressing that every extension of mili-
tary courts' jurisdiction encroaches on the jurisdiction of the civil 
courts, and "acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial and of 
other treasured constitutional protections:'68 Quarles, Reid, and 
several later decisions69 stripped the military courts of jurisdiction 
over civilians and laid down the first of two prerequisites for juris-
diction of a court-martial: military status.70 
In 1969, the Supreme Court took a giant step forward, and for 
59. See infra notes 62-89 and accompanying text. 
60. See Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 362-63 (1971); O'Callahan v. Parker, 
395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969). • 
61. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (quoting United States ex rel. 
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (emphasis in original». 
62. 350 U.S. 11 (1955). 
63. See id. at 23. 
64. See id. at 14-15,17. 
65. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
66. See id. at 19. 
67. See id. at 35-36. 
68. fd. at 21. 
69. See Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960) (military dependant cannot 
be tried for noncapital offenses); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284-86 (1960) 
(no jurisdiction over civilian employees); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 582-83 
(1958) (no jurisdiction over military personnel for crimes committed before 
induction). 
70. See D. SCHLUETER, supra note 18, at 126. In dictum, the Reid Court expressed 
that military courts might have jurisdiction to try a civilian only if the civilian is ar-
rested in an area of actual fighting. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 33-35. 
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the first time denied a military court jurisdiction to try an active 
servicemember. In O'Callahan v. Parker,71 a sergeant in the 
United States Army was charged with housebreaking, attempted 
rape, and assault with intent to rape while properly off-base and 
on leave.72 The Supreme Court held that the defendant's military 
status, although necessary, was not sufficient to establish the mili-
tary court's jurisdiction.73 The Court enunciated the further re-
quirement that for a court-martial to have jurisdiction, the alleged 
offense "must be service connected."74 If it is not, the defendant is 
entitled to a trial in a civilian COurt.75 
In restricting the military court's jurisdiction over active ser-
vicemembers, the O'Callahan Court emphasized the constitutional 
stakes, the weaknesses in court-martial proceedings, and the 
threat to liberty engendered by any unnecessary expansion of mil-
itary discipline.76 In a vehement condemnation of the military 
courts, the Court stated: "[C]ourts-martial as an institution are 
singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitu-
tionallaw .... "77 
In enumerating the service-connection requirement, the Court 
engendered some confusion by failing to formulate any simple test 
for determining the presence or absence of service connection in a 
given case.78 Instead, the Court discussed a series of factors indi-
cating the lack of service connection: the defendant was properly 
absent from the base; the crime was committed off a military post; 
there was no connection between the defendant's military duties 
and the crime; the offense was committed within the United 
States' territorial limits, during peacetime; and the offense did not 
threaten military security, property, or authority.79 
Two years later, in a unanimous decision, the Court attempted 
to clarify o 'Callahan, refining the service-connection test by 
applying it in a different factual context. In Relford v. Comman-
71. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
72. fd. at 260. 
73. See id. at 267 ("[C]ourt-martial jurisdiction cannot be extended to reach any 
person not a member of the Armed Forces at the times of both the offense and the 
trial."). 
74. fd. at 272. 
75. fd. at 273-74. 
76. See id. at 262-65. 
77. fd. at 265. The Court further observed: "A civilian trial ... is held in an 
atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights, while a military trial is 
marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice." [d. at 266 (footnote 
omitted). 
78. Comment, O'Callahan v. Parker, A Military Jurisdictional Dilemma, 22 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 64, 69 (1970); Note, Constitutional Law - Non-Military Offenses Com-
mitted Off Post While on Leave Not Justiciable by Courts Martia~ 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 
335, 340-41 (1970); 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 630, 634 (1970). 
79. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 273-74. 
1985] 127 
dant,80 the Court granted a court-martial jurisdiction over an 
Army corporal charged with kidnapping and raping two civilians 
who were properly within the military enclave.81 In reviewing the 
propriety of the jurisdiction of courts-martial, the Supreme Court 
again emphasized the tension between constitutional guarantees 
for individual citizens and constitutional provisions for the estab-
lishment of a military court system.82 To clarify the service-
connection analysis, the Relford Court listed the criteria empha-
sized in o 'Callahan, 83 stressed nine considerations relevant to a 
service-connection inquiry,84 and sanctioned an ad hoc approach 
for determining the presence of service connection.85 The Court 
apparently felt that only by carefully analyzing each case in light 
of a series of service-connection factors could courts balance the 
fundamental rights of the defendant and the legitimate exercise of 
military courts' power.86 The Court recognized that its ad hoc ap-
proach left "outer boundaries undetermined,"87 but concluded 
that Corporal Relford's alleged crimes were service connected.88 
Finally, the Court opined that its holding fully comported with 
80. 401 U.S. 355 (1971). 
81. See id. at 360-61. 
82. See id. at 362-63. 
83. See id. at 365. 
84. The Court stressed: 
(a) The military's interest in the security of persons and property on the 
military enclave; 
(b) the military commander's responsibility and authority to maintain 
order; 
(c) the adverse effect of crime upon the morale, discipline, reputation, and 
integrity of the base and its personnel, and upon the military operation 
and mission; 
(d) the conviction that article I vests Congress with the power to grant 
military courts the jurisdiction to try and punish military offenders; 
(e) the distinct possibility that civil, particularly nonfederal, courts will 
inadequately assess and respect the military's disciplinary authority 
within its own community; 
(f) the O'CaZlahan Court's implication that geographical and military rela-
tionships are important factors for ruling out a service connection; 
(g) the O'CaZlahan Court's recognition that even the Continental Con-
gress allowed military jurisdiction over crimes by service members against 
individuals associated with a military base; 
(h) the impropriety of interpreting the O'Callahan decision as confining 
the court-martial to purely military offenses with no counterpart in non-
military criminal law; and 
(i) the Court's inability to draw a meaningful distinction between strictly 
military and nonmilitary areas, or between a serviceman-defendant's on-
duty and off-duty activities and hours on the military post. 
See id. at 367-69. 
85. See id. at 365-66, 369; see also United States v. Moore, 1 M.J. 448, 450 (C.M.A. 
1976) (opining that the Relford Court constitutionalized the need for a detailed analy-
sis of the enumerated jurisdictional criteria to resolve the service-connection issue). 
86. See Relford, 401 U.S. at 369. 
87. [d. The Court elaborated: "O'CaZZahan marks an area, perhaps not the limit, 
for the concern of the civil courts and where the military may not enter. The case 
today marks an area, perhaps not the limit, where the court-martial is appropriate 
and permissible. What lies between is for decision at another time." [d. 
88. See id. at 367, 369. The Court emphasized that the crimes were committed on 
a military base, the victims were properly on the base, tangible personal property on 
the base was impaired, and the security of the installation was threatened. [d. at 366-
67. In final analysis, the Court formulated a limited per se rule: "a serviceman's 
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the O'Callahan standard for limiting military courts' jurisdiction 
to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."89 
In 1975, the Supreme Court was once again faced with an oppor-
tunity to refine the service-connection test. In Schlesinger v. 
Councilman,90 the Court refused to enjoin a pending court-
martial, despite the defendant's assertion that his alleged acts 
were not service connected.91 The Court avoided the merits of the 
defendant's service-connection defense,92 choosing instead to limit 
the power of Article III courts to intervene in pending court-
martial proceedings.93 
In reaching its decision, the Court reemphasized that, "[of] 
course, if the offenses with which [the defendant] is charged are 
not 'service connected,' the military courts will have had no power 
to impose any punishment whatever."94 The Court departed from 
Justice Douglas's earlier scathing criticism of the military COurtS,95 
however, and stated that, in deference to Congress's judgment as 
embodied in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Court was 
required to assume that military courts can safeguard defendants' 
crime against the person of an individual upon the base or against property on the 
base is 'service connected' . . . ." Id. at 369. 
89. Id. at 369 (quoting O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265). 
90. 420 U.S. 738 (1975). 
91. See id. at 740. While off-post and off-duty, the defendant allegedly transferred 
small quantities of marijuana to an undercover agent who represented that he was 
also off-duty. Id. at 740-41. 
92. See id. at 743-44. Proceeding to the service-connection inquiry, the dissenting 
justices conducted an ad hoc analysis employing the Relford criteria, and found no 
service connection. See id. at 767 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
93. See id. at 758. Unlike the defendants in Relford and O'Callahan, who had 
exhausted their rights to review in the military-court system and had filed their 
habeas corpus petitions only upon actual imprisonment, see 401 U.S. at 362; 395 U.S. at 
261, the defendant in Councilman sought to enjoin his pending court-martial, see 420 
U.S. at 741-42. Although the Supreme Court did not hold that Congress had limited 
Article III court review of military court proceedings exclusively to habeas corpus 
proceedings, the Court found that Captain Councilman had not suffered such irrepa-
rable harm as to justify the extraordinary relief of enjoining a pending court-martial. 
See id. at 754-55. The Court withheld the district court's remedial power because the 
accused could "show no harm other than that attendant to resolution of his case in the 
military-court system." Id. at 758. Councilman was thereby required to pursue his 
rights through the military court system. See id. at 759-60. The Court in no way lim-
ited Councilman's ultimate right to seek review of the military court's assertion of 
jurisdiction after exhausting his rights in the military courts. See id. at 758. 
The Court reaffirmed Councilman in McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21, 33-34 
(1975) (" 'When a serviceman ... can show no harm other than that attendant to 
resolution of his case in the military court system, the federal district courts must 
refrain from intervention.''') (quoting Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758). It remains un-
clear what situation might justify a federal court's intervention in court-martial pro-
ceedings other than by habeas corpus relief. See Bartley, Military Law in the 1970's: 
The Effects of Schlesinger v. Councilman, 17 A.F.L. REv., Winter 1975, at 65, 71. 
94. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 760. 
95. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265-66. 
constitutional rights.96 The Court recognized that the service-
connection inquiry is a matter within the singular expertise of 
military courts, and concluded that military courts' judgments are 
indispensable to an informed review by Article III COurtS.97 Yet, 
notwithstanding this apparent reassessment of military courts' 
competence, the Councilman Court reaffirmed the ad hoc ap-
proach of Relford and concluded that the service-connection de-
termination "often will turn on the precise set of facts in which 
the offense has occurred."98 The ad hoc test thus remained the 
linchpin of the Court's service-connection analysis. 
The chief consequence of Schlesinger v. Councilman has been a 
substantial restriction of Article III courts' review of military 
courts' determinations.99 Thus, since Councilman, military courts 
have been the primary arena for litigating the service-connection 
doctrine. This Note now analyzes military courts' development of 
the service-connection test, focusing on the courts' application of 
the test to drug-related offenses. This Note concludes that the 
current approach of military courts - a per se approach that holds 
virtually all drug-related offenses involving servicemembers to be 
service connected - violates the Supreme Court's test for military 
courts' jurisdiction. 
III Military Courts' Application of the Service-
Connection Requirement to Drug-Related Offenses 
During the late 1960s, the military experienced a growing drug-
abuse problem,loo and, in the ensuing years, military courts 
96. See Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758 ("[I]mplicit in the congressional scheme em-
bodied in the Code is the view that the military court system generally is adequate to 
and responsibly will perform its assigned task."). 
97. See id. at 760. 
98. See id. (citing Relford, 401 U.S. at 365-66). 
99. By restricting federal courts' review of military cases to habeas corpus peti-
tions, and by leaving only a narrow undefined opening for equitable jurisdiction when 
a servicemember can show harm other than that attendant to the resolution of a case, 
the Court closed the paths by which many military defendants had reached Article III 
courts. See, e.g., Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that a federal 
conviction for drug possession is sufficient for judicial review even though defendant 
failed to exhaust existing military remedies); Gerko v. Commanding Officer, 314 F.2d 
858 (10th Cir. 1963) (in light of Sixth Amendment's provision for a speedy trial, judi-
cial review granted to determine whether military court properly exercised jurisdic-
tion over defendant whose term of enlistment expired prior to date of court-martial 
proceedings); Redmond v. Warner, 353 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Hawaii 1973) (holding that 
defendant's good faith allegation that court-martial is without jurisdiction is sufficient 
to establish grounds for Article III courts' review); Moylan v. Laird, 305 F. Supp. 551 
(D.R.I. 1969) (off-base possession of marijuana established substantial question as to 
military court's jurisdiction appropriate for Article III court review); see also Bartley, 
supra note 93, at 78 ("The difficulty of surmounting the equitable jurisdiction require-
ment makes it doubtful that the [service-connection] issue will come before the Court 
again in the near future."). 
100. See Use of Drugs in the Military Services: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
the Dep't of Defense of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 252 
(1971) (investigations of drug use in the Army, Navy, and Air Force climbed from 
2,482 in 1966 to 37,208 in 1970). 
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processed many drug-related cases.101 Although most off-base 
offenses are clearly not service-connected, the military has long 
argued that drug-related offenses pose unique problems and that 
even those committed off-base are service-connected.102 As a con-
sequence, the service-connection inquiry frequently has been liti-
gated in cases involving drug-related offenses. 
The Court of Military Appeals/o3 the supreme military court, 
has taken the lead in formulating military courts' service-
connection analysis. Immediately after the Supreme Court de-
cided O'Callahan, the Court of Military Appeals broadly held, in 
United States 'V. Beeker,104 that both wrongful use and wrongful 
possession of marijuana or narcotics "on or off base, has singular 
military significance which carries [each] act outside the limitation 
on military jurisdiction set out in the O'Callahan case."105 Under 
this per se rule, military courts concluded that servicemembers 
accused of any drug-related offense - wherever or whenever 
committed - were automatically subject to courts-martial. For 
the next seven years, the per se rule was applied to all cases in-
volving drug-related offenses in the military COurts.106 
In marked contrast to the military courts' per se approach to 
determining jurisdiction in drug-related cases, the lower Article 
III courts properly employed the Supreme Court's ad hoc analysis 
and consistently restricted military courts' jurisdiction over de-
fendants charged with off-base offenses involving nonaddictive 
drugs.107 Thus, for a number of years immediately following the 
101. [d. at 253 (by 1970, the Department of Defense reported 4,908 courts-martial 
and 5,906 nonjudicial punishments for drug-related offenses). 
102. Supplemental Brief on Behalf of the United States at 15-16, United States v. 
Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 344 n.18 (C.M.A. 1980). 
103. The Court of Military Appeals is a civilian appellate forum attached to the 
Department of Defense that reviews questions of law arising from decisions by Courts 
of Military Review. 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(1), (d) (1982). The President appoints the 
three civilian judges for 15-year terms. [d. § 867(a)(1). The Court of Military Appeals 
reviews all lower military-court decisions involving death sentences, id. § 867(b)(1) 
(Supp. II 1984), cases certified by a Judge Advocate General, id. § 867(b)(2) (1982), and 
hears some cases after accepting an accused's petition for review, id. § 867(b)(2). See 
generally Cooke, The United States Court of Military Appeals, 1975-1977: Judicializ-
ing the Military Justice System, 76 MIL. L. REv. 43 (1977) (discussing the court's au-
thority, operation, and related jurisdictional issues). 
104. 18 C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969). 
105. [d. at 565, 40 C.M.R. at 277. 
106. See, e.g., United States v. Sexton, 23 C.M.A. 101, 103, 48 C.M.R. 662, 664 (1974) 
(oral agreement to sell marijuana and the transfer of money at the base is a service-
connected offense); Rainville v. Lee, 22 C.M.A. 464, 464, 47 C.M.R. 555, 555 (1973) (off-
base possession, use, and sale of marijuana while off duty and out of uniform held 
service connected); United States v. Adams, 19 C.M.A. 75, 76, 41 C.M.R. 75, 76 (1969) 
(possession of marijuana, whether on- or off-base, is service connected); United States 
v. Rose, 19 C.M.A. 3, 4, 41 C.M.R. 3, 4 (1969) (possession and delivery of barbiturates, 
whether on- or off-base, is service connected). 
107. See, e.g., Peterson v. Goodwin, 512 F.2d 479,480 (5th Cir.) (off-base possession 
O'Callahan decision, the military and Article III courts took 
sharply different views of the meaning of service connection. 
In 1976, however, the Court of Military Appeals acknowledged 
its "own prior analytical shortcomings,"108 and overruled Beeker 
and its per se approach to jurisdiction over drug offenses.109 The 
Court of Military Appeals adopted an "analytical process of care-
fully balancing the Relford criteria. . . on a case-by-case, offense-
by-offense basis,"llo and began reading the Supreme Court's opin-
ions as a mandate to abandon any simplistic formulations of the 
service-connection test.ll1 The ad hoc approach mandated by the 
Supreme Court in Relford thus became the cornerstone of the 
service-connection analysis in both Article III and military 
COurtS.l12 
In 1980, however, the Court of Military Appeals again drasti-
cally altered its interpretation of the service-connection require-
ment. In United States v. Trottier,113 a special court-martial 
convicted the defendant of selling marijuana and lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD) to an Air Force informant at an off-base 
apartment.1l4 Because the informant professed an intention to 
distribute the drugs on a military base, the Court of Military Ap-
peals could have found a service connection based on precedent.1l5 
Instead, the court chose to extend its analysis beyond the facts 
before it and to reconsider completely its interpretation of the ser-
vice-connection requirement.1l6 
The Trottier court concluded that "almost every involvement of 
service personnel with the commerce in drugs is 'service 
of heroin, an addictive drug, is service connected due to its unique threat to base oper-
ation), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975); Councilman v. Laird, 481 F.2d 613, 614 (10th 
Cir. 1973) (off-base sale and transfer of marijuana to an undercover enlisted person 
not service connected), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 
420 U.S. 738, 740 (1975); Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829,833 (5th Cir. 1972) (off-base, off-
duty possession and use of marijuana while in civilian clothes not service connected); 
Holder v. Richardson, 364 F. Supp. 1207, 1210, 1212 (D.D.C. 1973) (wrongful use and 
possession of marijuana off-base not service connected); Redmond v. Warner, 355 
F. Supp. 812, 816 (D. Hawaii 1973) (off-base, off-duty possession and sale of controlled 
substances to servicemember in civilian clothes not service connected); Schroth v. 
Warner, 353 F. Supp. 1032, 1043 (D. Hawaii 1973) (off-base possession and transfer of 
controlled substances to undercover serviceman not service connected); Lyle v. 
Kincaid, 344 F. Supp. 223, 225 (off-base possession of small amount of marijuana not 
service connected), modified, 352 F. Supp. 81 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
108. United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, 28 n.1, 28-29 (C.M.A. 1976). 
109. See id. at 29. 
110. United States v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414, 416 (C.M.A. 1977). 
111. See, e.g., id.; United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, 28 (C.M.A. 1976); United 
States v. Moore, 1 M.J. 448, 450 (C.M.A. 1976). 
112. The Court of Military Appeals zealously adhered to the Supreme Court's 
analysis and mandated that the government affirmatively establish the Relford fac-
tors through sworn pleadings. See United States v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414, 419 (C.M.A. 1977). 
113. 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980). 
114. Id. at 338-39. 
115. Id. at 339. In prior decisions, the Court of Military Appeals had consistently 
held that sale of narcotics to a servicemember who professed the intention to intro-
duce the narcotics on a military installation was service connected. See, e.g., United 
States v. Chambers, 7 M.J. 24, 24 (C.M.A. 1979). 
116. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 339. 
Military Courts' Jurisdiction 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
connected.' "117 In reaching that conclusion, the court did not re-
turn completely to the per se approach of Beeker; 118 it noted that 
in unusual circumstances certain drug-related offenses might not 
be service connected.119 Yet, the Trottier court greatly minimized 
the importance of the ad hoc approach mandated by the Relford 
decision.120 Instead, the court postulated that military courts have 
jurisdiction over whole classes of drug offenses and that courts 
need not take an ad hoc approach in every case.121 Ultimately the 
Trottier Court applied the Relford criteria to the facts before it;122 
however, the court made a series of sweeping generalizations that 
led it to conclude that the service-connection inquiry ought to be 
made far more flexible.123 Not surprisingly, the court found the 
defendant's offenses service connected.124 
IV: Critique of the Military Courts' Application 
of the Service-Connection Requirement to 
Drug-Related Offenses 
In United States v. Trottier, the Court of Military Appeals rein-
terpreted the service-connection requirement in the context of 
drug-related offenses, and vastly expanded its jurisdiction to try 
cases involving such offenses by returning, at least in practice, to a 
per se rule for military courts' jurisdiction over drug-related 
117. Id. at 350 (footnote omitted). 
118. See id. at 352 n.34. But see id. at 353 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
the majority opinion revives Beeker and "discloses. . . a lessening of the requirement 
that the Government fulfill its obligation ... to meet the letter of the law"). 
119. See id. at 350 n.28. The court noted: 
For instance, it would not appear that use of marihuana by a serviceperson 
on a lengthy period of leave away from the military community would 
have such an effect on the military as to warrant the invocation of a claim 
of special military interest and significance adequate to support court-mar-
tial jurisdiction under O'Callahan. Similarly, the interest of the military 
in the sale of a small amount of contraband substance by a military person 
to a civilian for the latter's personal use seems attenuated. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
120. See id. 
121. See id. at 345. The court asked and answered its own rhetorical question: 
"[D]id the Supreme Court intend that each individual case be dealt with separately 
and that no classes of cases be recognized in which military jurisdiction exists? 
Relford implies that the ad hoc approach need not necessarily be taken to this ex-
treme." Id. 
122. See id. at 351-53. 
123. The court emphasized the gravity of the drug problem in the armed forces, 
and concluded that the problem was so severe that it required the extension of court-
martial jurisdiction "to the greatest extent legally permissible." Id. at 346. Asserting 
that "[e]ven constitutional law must be molded to the times," id. at 344, the court 
broadly concluded that almost all drug-related offenses involving service personnel 
are service connected, see id. at 350. 
124. See id. at 352-53. 
cases.125 Indeed, since Trottier, the military high court has expan-
sively interpreted its jurisdiction to hear cases involving service 
members' drug offenses.126 This Note argues that the Trottier 
court's rationale is seriously flawed, and that military courts' re-
cent assertions of jurisdiction over drug-related offenses directly 
contradict both the letter and spirit of the Supreme Court's 
decisions requiring an ad hoc approach to assessing the service-
connection requirement for courts' -martial jurisdiction. 
In deciding Trottier, the Court of Military Appeals observed 
that the Supreme Court's decision in Schlesinger v. Councilman127 
arguably supports the conclusion that a "slavish" application of 
the Relford criteria is no longer required.128 In Councilman, how-
ever, the Court never reached the merits of the defendant's ser-
vice-connection claim.129 Instead, by limiting the power of federal 
courts to enjoin pending courts-martial, the Councilman Court 
avoided the service-connection issue entirely. Although the 
Court tempered its prior criticism of military courts and recog-
nized the relevance of military courts' expertise, the Court also 
reemphasized the importance of the service-connection analysis 
and the need to closely analyze each factual situation.130 Indeed, 
the Councilman Court cited Relford for the proposition that the 
existence of service-connection "often will turn on the precise set 
of facts in which the offense has occurred."131 Thus, Councilman 
does not substantiate the Trottier court's redefinition of the 
service-connection requirement. 
The Trottier court also justified an expanded interpretation of 
its jurisdiction over drug-related offenses by asserting that "con-
stitutionallaw must be molded to the times."132 For support, the 
court cited two decisions in which the Supreme Court broadly dis-
cussed the validity of interpreting constitutional principles elasti-
cally.133 In the first of the decisions relied on by the Trottier 
court, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Depression created a 
national emergency justifying an interpretation of the contract 
clause that varied from the one offered by the framers almost a 
century and a half earlier.134 The Trottier court further supported 
125. See id. at 352; Schutz, Trottier and the War Against Drugs: An Update, 1983 
.ARMY LAw. 20, 21, 23-24. 
126. See infra notes 177-88 and accompanying text. 
127. 420 U.S. 738 (1975). 
128. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 343. Although the Trottier court did not explicitly re-
ject the Relford criteria, it expressed a clear preference for a "flexible application of 
the concept." Id. at 345. 
129. See 420 U.S. at 740; supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 
130. See id. at 760. 
131. Id. (citing Relford, 401 U.S. at 365-66). 
132. Trottier, 9 M.J. at 344. The court apparently felt that the seriousness of drug 
abuse in the armed forces justified its "molding" the service-connection requirement 
to "changing conditions." See id. at 345-50. 
133. See id. at 344-45 (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 
(1934); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926»; infra notes 134-37 and 
accompanying text. 
134. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-45 (1934). In 
Blaisdell, the Court upheld a state statute extending the time allowed for redeeming 
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its assertion by citing a decision in which the Supreme Court con-
sidered the extent to which the country's demographics had 
changed in the more than 130 years since the ratification of the 
Constitution as a justification for rejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge to the validity of zoning laws.13s 
Neither of these decisions supports the Court of Military Ap-
peals' decision to mold the service-connection requirement to 
meet the exigencies of drug abuse in the military. The Supreme 
Court's decision to reinterpret a constitutional provision when 
more than a century of societal changes have rendered its initial 
interpretation obsolete,136 or when a national emergency has pro-
duced circumstances unforeseen by the framers,137 is simply not 
analogous to the situation that confronted the Trottier court. In 
Trottier, the Court of Military Appeals reinterpreted two 
Supreme Court cases - O'Callahan and Relford - decided within 
the preceding nine years. The gravity of drug abuse in the mili-
tary had been widely recognized prior to both O'Callahan and 
Relford,138 and there was neither a dramatic emergency compara-
ble to the Depression, nor a gradual societal change justifying a 
reinterpretation of the constitutionally mandated service-
connection analysis. Nonetheless, the Court of Military Appeals 
performed exactly such a reinterpretation. 
The Trottier court further justified its expanded jurisdiction 
under a reformulated service-connection test by emphasizing the 
broad reach of Congress's war powers.139 The court asserted that 
the war powers are plenary, applying equally both in wartime and 
in peacetime.140 Analogizing to Congress's broad remedial powers 
under the commerce clause, the court claimed that the war power 
embued Congress - and, in turn, courts-martial- with the broad 
power to rid the military of drug abuse and thereby preserve our 
real property following foreclosure, altering preexisting contractual relations. See id. 
at 447. 
135. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 344-45 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 
386-87 (1926) (zoning regulations that would have been invalidated 30 years earlier 
can now be upheld due to increased congestion and complexity of contemporary 
urban life». 
136. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87. 
137. See Blaisden 290 U.S. at 428. 
138. See generally Donnelly, Mary Jane in Action, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1967, at 40 
(discussing marijuana use by servicemembers throughout Vietnam); Marijuana 
Termed Big Problem Among U.S. Troops in Vietnam, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1967 at 4, 
col. 3 (finding more servicemembers arrested on marijuana charges than on any other 
charge); Shuster, Addict Says He Shot 2 South Vietnamese While High, N.Y. Times, 
June 15, 1966 at 1, col. 3 (servicemember testified to his use of drugs in Vietnam at 
hearings in the Senate). 
139. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 346-50 (stating that because Congress created the mili-
tary courts pursuant to its Article I powers, Congress's war powers conferred broad 
jurisdiction upon the courts-martial). 
140. See id. at 347-50. 
military preparedness.141 
These sweeping assertions fly in the face of the Supreme 
Court's precedents restricting military courts' jurisdiction. When 
the war powers do not conflict with provisions in the Bill of 
Rights, they, like the commerce power, are very broad;l42 how-
ever, the Supreme Court initially adopted the service-connection 
test to safeguard the individual liberties of military defendants.143 
In deciding Relford and O'Callahan, the Court fully considered 
Congress's Article I powers and nonetheless concluded that mili-
tary courts' deprivation of defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights mandated the application of a service-connection test 
to limit military courts' jurisdiction.l44 Because the Commerce 
Clause decisions relied upon by the Trottier COurt145 did not in-
volve any conflict between Congress's power to regulate interstate 
commerce and constitutionally protected individual liberties,146 
the cited decisions in no way support the Trottier court's redefini-
tion of the service-connection requirement. 
The military court further misconstrued the scope of Congress's 
war powers by asserting that these powers are as broad during 
peacetime as they are during war, at least as the powers apply to 
servicepersons.147 In Reid v. Covert, one of the earliest decisions 
in which the Supreme Court limited the jurisdiction of military 
courts, the Court found the absence of hostilities fatal to the 
141. See id. at 349-50. 
142. The Supreme Court has generally given Congress wide discretion in its exer-
cise of the war powers. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (pre-
scription of curfew as an emergency war measure is within the constitutional scope of 
congressional and executive discretion). However, like all of Congress's Article I 
powers, the Bill of Rights limits Congress's exercise of the war powers. See Hamilton 
v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919); see also 2 ANTlEAu, 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT § 12:73 
(1969) (Congress's normally broad war powers are limited when they conflict with 
provisions in the Bill of Rights). 
143. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272-73. 
144. See Relford, 401 U.S. at 362-66; O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272-73. 
145. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 348-49. 
146. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) 
(Congress may prohibit racial discrimination in public accomodations serving inter-
state travellers); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961) (Congress may preempt 
state law by establishing standards for tobacco products); North American Co. v. SEC, 
327 U.S. 686, 704-05 (1946) (Congress may regulate public-utility holding companies 
engaged in interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (Con-
gress may regulate wheat produced for personal consumption in order to control 
prices in interstate commerce); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 
125 (1942) (Congress may regulate handling of intrastate transactions so related to 
interstate milk commerce as to substantially interfere with regulation of the latter); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (Congress may prohibit interstate 
shipment of goods produced under substandard labor conditions); Weiss v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 321, 327 (1939) (Congress may regulate intrastate communications to 
protect interstate communications); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 48 (1939) (Congress 
may set quotas on tobacco to avoid oversupply of tobacco); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 
1, 13-14 (1939) (Congress may establish standards for, designate auction markets for, 
and require inspection of tobacco involved in interstate-commerce transactions); 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (Congress may safeguard 
employees' right to organize in plant engaged in interstate commerce). 
147. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 347-48. 
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government's reliance on the war powers as the basis for military 
jurisdiction.148 Further, in elaborating on the service-connection 
requirement in O'Callahan, the Court explicitly stated: "[W]e 
deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority stemming from 
the war power."149 
Nonetheless, the Trottier court proposed that "for trying 
servicepersons, a realistic view of the role of our military in the 
modern world minimizes any need for preoccupation with the 
presence or absence of actual hostilities."15o The decisions that it 
relied upon,151 however, in no way support a departure from the 
Supreme Court's emphasis on limiting the military's peacetime 
jurisdiction via a service-connection inquiry. In Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority,152 for example, the Supreme Court 
took judicial notice that when Congress approved construction of 
the Wilson Dam in 1916, it did so in anticipation of World War I.153 
The Ashwander Court broadly construed Congress's war powers 
specifically because active hostilities were anticipated.154 
The Court of Military Appeals' reliance on Brown v. Glines155 to 
support its assertion that the presence or absence of hostilities is 
irrelevant to the scope of Congress's war powers was similarly 
misplaced.156 In Brown, the Supreme Court upheld an Air Force 
regulation requiring members of that service to obtain approval 
from their commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force 
bases.157 The restriction on freedom of speech was limited: it re-
stricted only on-base activity and permitted the commander to dis-
allow a petition only if the petition posed a clear danger to the 
military.158 The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the 
148. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1957). The Trottier court distinguished 
the Reid decision as a basis for restricting military courts' jurisdiction over civilians, 
and argued for expansive peacetime jurisdiction over servicepersons. See Trottier, 9 
M.J. at 347. 
149. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 273. 
150. Trottier, 9 M.J. at 347 (emphasis in original). 
151. See id. at 347 (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 
(1936); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980». 
152. 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
153. See id. at 327. 
154. Further, unlike Trottier, the state action in Ashwander did not infringe on any 
constitutionally protected individual liberties. See id. at 339-40. Instead, it involved 
an attempt by a utility company's shareholders to prevent the sale of transmission 
lines to the Tennessee Valley Authority. Id. 
155. 444 U.S. 348 (1980). 
156. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 347. The Trottier court's citation of Brown shows its 
limited application to exigent circumstances, emphasizing "that there are 'special dan-
gers present in certain military situations' that 'may warrant' special 'restrictions on 
the rights of military persons." Id. (quoting Brown, 444 U.S. at 356 n.14). 
157. See Brown, 444 U.S. at 361. 
158. Id. at 355. 
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necessity of protecting the integrity of military bases.159 Indeed, 
the Relford Court held that on-base violations of the security of 
persons or property are per se service-connected offenses.16o At 
the same time, however, Relford reasserted o 'Callahan ~ reliance 
on the peacetime-wartime distinction.161 Brown v. Glines did not 
undermine that distinction; it merely reaffirmed the Court's ac-
ceptance of the military's special need to restrict on-base activity 
that threatens military preparedness and poses a clear danger to 
the military.162 
Perhaps most telling of the Trottier court's refusal to accept 
restrictions on military courts' jurisdiction over drug-related 
offenses is the court's devaluation of the rights to trial by jury and 
indictment by grand jury.163 Although military courts' denial of 
these guarantees sparked the Supreme Court's enunciation of the 
service-connection test,164 the Trottier court chose to emphasize 
the limits of these guarantees,165 asserting that the denial of these 
rights would not subject servicemembers charged with off-base 
drug-related offenses to " 'drumhead justice.' "166 
Finally, the Trottier court disregarded the Supreme Court's re-
peated warning that courts' -martial jurisdiction must be limited to 
"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed. "167 While 
summarily acknowledging the Supreme Court's mandate, the 
Court of Military Appeals instead declared that courts-martial 
must exercise jurisdiction over drug-related offenses "to the great-
est extent legally permissible."168 By broadly redefining the ex-
tent of its jurisdiction, and by minimizing the importance of the 
159. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (stating that the policy of 
keeping on-base activities free from partisan political involvement consistent with 
constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military); Relford, 401 U.S. at 369. 
160. See Relford, 401 U.S. at 369. 
161. See id. at 365. 
162. The Court of Military Appeals seemed to recognize the tenuousness of its cita-
tion to Brown as support for disregarding the distinction between peacetime and war-
time activities of servicemembers. The court admitted that Brown only "implied" 
that the presence or absence of actual hostilities was no longer important. See 
Trottier, 9 M.J. at 347. 
163. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 351. 
164. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272-73. 
165. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 351. The military court remarked that the Supreme 
Court has not incorporated the right to indictment by grand jury in the fourteenth 
amendment due process provisions, and that the Court did not retroactively apply the 
right to trial by jury or the requirements of the O'Callahan decision. See id. 
166. Id. 
167. Relford, 401 U.S. at 369 (emphasis added); O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265 (empha-
sis in original); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (emphasis 
in original). 
168. Trottier, 9 M.J. at 346 (citing Reinstitution of Procedures for Registration 
Under the Military Selective Service Act: Hearings on S.109 & S.226 Before the Sub-
comm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 51-53 (1979) (statements of Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., Chief of Staff, United States 
Air Force; Adm. Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Bernard W. 
Rogers, Chief of Staff, United States Army; and Gen. Louis H. Wilson, Commandant, 
United States Marine Corps) (criticizing Court of Military Appeals' restriction of 
court-martial jurisdiction, making it virtually impossible to punish servicemembers 
who commit drug offenses off-base». 
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fundamental rights to trial by jury and grand jury indictment, the 
Court of Military Appeals violated the spirit, if not the letter, of 
O'Callahan and Relford. 
In sum, the Trottier decision violated the Supreme Court's man-
date for an ad hoc determination of whether a given offense is ser-
vice connected. Though the Trottier court concluded by actually 
applying the Relford criteria to the case before it,169 the court's 
expansive rationale indicates that it paid only lip service to the ad 
hoc approach. Instead of carefully balancing the service-
connection criteria set forth in Relford, assuring that military 
jurisdiction - and its attendant limitations on individual rights -
will be limited to "the least possible power, " the court vastly ex-
panded its jurisdiction by laying down a nearly per se rule for 
jurisdiction over off-base, drug-related offenses. Indeed, by im-
plicitly concluding that the interests in military discipline and 
preparedness automatically outweigh all of the other Relford fac-
tors, the Trottier court turned Relford and O'Callahan on their 
heads. For servicemembers charged with drug-related offenses, 
the important individual rights that an ad hoc, service-connection 
inquiry helps protect were thus eliminated from consideration. 
Since Trottier, military courts have taken an even more cursory 
approach to the service-connection requirement in cases involving 
drug-related offenses.17o 
When it was handed down, the Trottier decision was widely re-
garded as heralding the return of the military courts' per se rule 
announced in United States v. Beeker.171 Lower military courts 
immediately expanded the scope of Trottier's jurisdiction analy-
sis.172 In United States v. Brace,173 decided only eight months after 
Trottier, a serviceman was charged with the use and possession of 
marijuana while on a six-day leave, 275 miles from his base.174 
The dissenting judge found that the facts of Brace fit squarely 
within one of the Trottier court's two exceptions to a per se rule 
for jurisdiction over drug-related offenses - the exception for use 
of drugs while on extended leave from the base.175 Nonetheless, 
the majority, finding no reason to apply any exception to Trottier's 
169. See 9 M.J. at 351-52. 
170. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
171. See generally Trottier, 9 M.J. at 353 (Fletcher, J., concurring) ("the majority 
opinion is a homograft of Beeker"); Schutz, supra note 125, at 20, 26 (statements by the 
chief judge of the Court of Military Appeals and recent decisions by lower military 
courts indicate that Trottier is coextensive with Beeker). 
172. See, e.g., United States v. Lange, 11 M.J. 884 (A.F.C.M.R.1981); United States 
v. Brace, 11 M.J. 794 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981); see also infra notes 173-76 and accompanying 
text (discussing Brace). 
173. 11 M.J. 794 (A.F.C.M.R.1981). 
174. fd. at 794. 
175. fd. at 795 (Kastl, J., dissenting) (citing Trottier, 9 M.J. at 350 n.28). 
general principles, did not even allude to the Relford Court's 
criteria for service-connected offenses.176 
Recent decisions of the Court of Military Appeals remove any 
doubts that the court has returned to an essentially per se rule for 
finding service connection in drug-related offenses. In Murray v. 
Haldeman,177 the defendant was charged with using marijuana 
while on an authorized one-month leave from the service.178 A 
compulsory urine test given to the defendant soon after he re-
ported for duty showed that he had at some prior time used mari-
juana.179 The lower military court ruled . against Murray's 
contention that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction,180 and the 
Court of Military Appeals affirmed that ruling.18l 
The Court of Military Appeals held that "even when a ser-
vicemember uses a psychoactive drug in private while he is on ex-
tended leave far away from any military installation, that use is 
service-connected, if he later enters a military installation while 
subject to any physiological or psychological effects of the 
drug."182 To support its conclusion, the court emphasized the 
gravity of the drug-abuse problem in the armed forces and the 
need to curtail drug-related offenses by military personnel.183 The 
court then turned to Trottier. Even though the facts paralleled 
Trottier's jurisdictional exception for use of drugs on a lengthy 
period of leave,184 the court held that the trace of THC present in 
Murray's urine was dispositive.185 Most significantly, the court did 
not even refer to the Relford criteria; instead, it simply cited the 
Trottier court's broad justifications for redefining the service-
connection test.186 
In effect, the Murray court totally disregarded the ad hoc analy-
sis mandated by the Supreme Court to protect defendants' basic 
constitutional rights. In its cursory analysis, the military court 
relied solely upon Trottier's questionable reasoning and on the 
court's concern for the gravity of drug abuse in the military.187 
The Court of Military Appeals thus denied basic constitutional 
176. See Brace, 11 M.J. at 795. 
177. 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A.1983). 
178. Id. at 75-76. 
179. Id. at 76. 
180. Id. at 75. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 80 (emphasis added). In support, the court cited the Supreme Court's 
"[repeated recognition of] the importance of protecting the security and integrity of 
military installations." See id. n.6 (citations omitted). 
183. See id. at 78-79. 
184. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 350 n.28. 
185. See Murray, 16 M.J. at 80. 
186. See id. at 79-80; supra notes 128-68 and accompanying text. 
187. See Murray, 16 M.J. at 78-79. It is interesting to note that a 1982 survey com-
missioned by the Department of Defense found that overall drug use in the military 
forces had declined significantly since 1980, see R. BRAY, L. GUESS, R. MAsON, R. HUB-
BARD, D. SMITH, M. MARDSEN & J. RACHEL, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 1982 WORLDWIDE 
SURVEY OF ALcOHOL AND NONMEDICAL DRUG USE AMONG MILrrARY PERsONNEL 45 
(1983), and that the military's use of marijuana and cocaine was significantly lower 
than that of the civilian population; see id. at 54. 
140 VOL. 54:118 
Military Courts' Jurisdiction 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
rights to a defendant accused of a drug-related offense without 
properly employing the ad hoc analysis necessary to balance the 
military's need for discipline against the defendant's interest in a 
civilian trial.188 In the cases decided since Trottier and Murray, 
military courts have continued to ignore the ad hoc service-
connection test mandated by the Supreme Court in O'Callahan 
and Relford. Rather than perform detailed service-connection 
analyses of their own, military courts have simply cited Trottier 
and Murray to support ever-expanding assertions of jurisdiction 
over drug-related offenses.189 
188. Had the court actually performed an ad hoc service-connection analysis, it is 
extremely unlikely that it would have found Murray's alleged offenses service con-
nected. Murray was on an authorized one-month leave hundreds of miles from his 
military base when he allegedly used marijuana. Murray, 16 M.J. at 75. The only 
evidence of his alleged unlawful use was a trace of THC found in his urine when he 
submitted to a compulsory urinalysis upon returning to base at the end of his leave. 
Id. at 76. Very few, if any, of the 21 factors stressed by the Supreme Court in Relford, 
see supra notes 83-84, are implicated by Murray's personal use of marijuana while on 
an authorized, extended leave from his military base: Murray was properly absent 
from his base; his alleged crime was committed away from the base, in a place not 
under military control, and within United States' territorial limits; the alleged crime 
was committed during peacetime and was therefore unrelated to Congress's war 
power, see supra notes 147-62 and accompanying text; because of the inexactness and 
ineffectiveness of urinalysis for determining whether an individual's abilities remain 
in any way impaired simply because a trace of THC is found in his urine, see Perez-
Reyes, Di Guiseppi, Davis, Schindler & Cook, Comparison of Effects of Marijuana 
Cigarettes of Three Dif.ferent Potencies, 31 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEU-
TICS 617, 620 (1982); Whiting & Manders, Confirmation of a Tetrahydrocannabinol 
Metabolite in Urine by Gas Chromatography, 6 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 49, 49 
(1982), there was no evidence of any connection between Murray's military duties and 
his alleged offense; Murray was not engaged in the performance of any duty related to 
the military when he committed his alleged offense; civilian courts also prosecute 
drug offenses; Murray's alleged use of marijuana while on an authorized, extended 
leave did not likely constitute a flouting of military authority; Murray's alleged 
offense did not threaten the military post or any military property; and Murray's 
alleged offense did not threaten the security of persons on his military base. 
189. See, e.g., United States v. Hemenway, 19 M.J. 955, 956 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985) (use 
of cocaine during 40-day leave provides unique military interest sufficient to support 
jurisdiction); United States v. Brown, 19 M.J. 826, 831 (N.M.C.M.R. 1984) (pursuant to 
Murray, a positive urinalysis test for drugs alone confers jurisdiction upon a court-
martial, with no added need for a showing of impairment); United States v. Frost, 19 
M.J. 509, 511 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984) (positive urinalysis satisfies the jurisdictional require-
ment for courts-martial); United States v. White,17 M.J.1119,l120 (N.M.C.M.R.1984) 
(admissions by accused as to his use of marijuana would be sufficient to satisfy the 
service-connection test because the military has a special interest in punishing illegal 
conduct that has the effect of lowering public esteem for the service); United States v. 
Stookey, 14 M.J. 975, 976 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982) (the two jurisdictional exceptions in 
Trottier do not apply to a servicemember on leave who remains in the local civilian 
community adjoining a military base); United States v. Lange, 11 M.J. 884, 885-86 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1981) (accused's use of marijuana on leave in a remote location held ser-
vice connected because he later participated in a drug-rehabilitation program and his 
absence had an adverse impact on the mission of his unit); United States v. Brace, 11 
M.J. 794, 795 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981) (airman's remote use of marijuana service connected 
due to potential and actual adverse impact on military authority, discipline, security, 
morale, mission, and readiness). 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court designed the service-connection inquiry to 
balance the military's need for discipline with the defendant's con-
stitutional rights to a jury trial and a grand jury indictment. Since 
the Trottier decision, the military courts have focused exclusively 
on the perceived severity of the drug problem in the armed 
services and have disregarded both the defendants' rights and the 
Supreme Court's test designed to preserve those rights. If military 
defendants are to be guaranteed their fundamental constitutional 
rights, Trottier and the line of decisions following it must be over-
ruled, and the military courts must return to a diligent application 
of the service-connection criteria. "Today, as always, the people, 
no less than their courts, must remain vigilant to preserve the 
principles of our Bill of Rights, lest in our desire to be secure we 
lose our ability to be free."190 
190. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 203 (1962). 
